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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
Nos. 11-2767, 11-4032 & 13-1084 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD CORBIN 
a/k/a ASHEED 
a/k/a SHEED 
a/k/a RICHARD RASHEED CORBIN 
 
      Richard Corbin, 
       Appellant  (Nos. 11-2767 & 13-1084) 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOHNNIE CORLEY, 
a/k/a  
BLACK, 
a/k/a 
C, 
a/k/a  
CURLEY 
 
       Johnnie Corley, 
      Appellant  (No. 11-4032) 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action Nos. 2-10-cr-00352-002/3) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
________________ 
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 21, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellants Richard “Rasheed” Corbin and Johnnie Corley were the ringleaders of 
a group of armed robbers who targeted pharmacies as their victims.  The group’s aim was 
to steal drugs that were sought on the “street.”  Corbin and Corley were charged with, 
among other things, conspiracy to commit robbery that interferes with interstate 
commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), robbery that interferes with interstate commerce, 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Hobbs Act robbery”), and using and carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).   
 Before their joint trial, the District Court granted the Government’s motion to 
dismiss one of the § 924(c) counts on which Corbin was indicted.  The jury convicted 
him and Corley on all other charges (except for one of the § 924 counts against Corley).  
A few days after the jury returned its verdict, they were sentenced.  Applying the 
statutory mandatory minimums that trigger when there are successive § 924(c) violations, 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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the District Court sentenced Corley to 964 months’ imprisonment and Corbin to 1,284 
months.  They appeal.1 
I. 
 On appeal, Corbin and Corley take a kitchen-sink approach, listing over 15 
perceived errors aimed at setting aside their convictions and sentences.  We have 
considered all their arguments, but address in detail only the more meritorious ones.  
They are that: (1) Corbin and Corley’s speedy trial rights were violated; (2) the District 
Court abused its discretion in admitting certain bad acts evidence; and (3) it erred in 
imposing their respective sentences.      
A.  
 Corbin and Corley argue for the first time on appeal that their rights under the 
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), were violated.  They invoke the so-called “ruse 
exception” to the Speedy Trial Act and contend that, because there was over a 30-day 
delay from the time they were arrested by state law enforcement officers until they were 
indicted on federal charges, their speedy trial rights were violated.  Because the District 
Court did not have the opportunity to take the first pass at addressing this argument, it is 
waived.  See United States v. Cherry, 720 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing that, 
of the Circuits to have addressed the question, they are uniformly of the view that “a 
defendant who does not file a speedy indictment motion before trial waives his right to 
raise that issue”).         
                                              
1  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
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 Corbin (but not Corley) also contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial 
was violated.  This argument fares no better than his statutory one.  Only if the period of 
delay is “presumptively prejudicial” do we apply the Barker v. Wingo balancing test to 
determine if a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights occurred.  
See United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514, 533 (1972)).  Under that four-factor test we consider: (1) the length of the 
delay; (2) the reason for it; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right; and (4) 
any prejudice to the defendant.  Even assuming that the period of delay Corbin complains 
about was “presumptively prejudicial,” his argument still falls flat.  The second, third, 
and fourth factors weigh decidedly against a finding of a speedy trial violation.  
 The principal cause for the length of delay (11 months) was not the Government’s 
dragging of its feet but Corley’s continuance requests and the numerous pretrial motions 
on which hearings were held.  As to the third factor, Corbin did not assert his speedy trial 
rights.  Quite the contrary.  In a document filed on February 24, 2011, he complained 
about the Magistrate’s rejection of his request for a 120-day continuance.  Finally, Corbin 
has made no showing of prejudice from the delay.    
B.  
 Corbin and Corley next fault the District Court for admitting evidence under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that the pair had previously conspired to rob drug 
dealers at gunpoint.  They contend the evidence shows only their propensity to commit 
robberies.  Not so.  As a general matter, “the Government has broad latitude to use ‘other 
acts’ evidence to prove a conspiracy.”  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 324 (3d Cir. 
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2002) (citation omitted).  It often uses this evidence to show how a group of defendants 
formed their illicit relationship and the degree to which they were familiar with each 
other.  See, e.g., United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 389 (3d Cir. 1989) (admitting Rule 
404(b) evidence where “the evidence of [] violence goes to a ‘shared tradition’ of 
violence and toward showing a ‘symbiotic relationship’”).   
 That happened here.  Evidence of Corbin and Corley’s prior conspiracy provided 
important background for the jury: how their criminal enterprise began and developed.  
See Cross, 308 F.3d at 324 (noting that “Rule 404(b) evidence is especially probative 
when the charged offense involves a conspiracy”) (citations omitted).  While it may have 
tainted their character to some extent, any prejudicial effect was, on balance, not as 
important as the inferential value of the evidence regarding the formation of their 
conspiratorial relationship.    
 Corbin advances an additional Rule 404(b) argument.  He contends that the 
District Court abused its discretion in permitting his former girlfriend and Government 
witness, Sharon Stevenson, to testify that he had physically abused her.  But this was only 
part of the story.  Stevenson’s real value as a Government witness was her first-hand 
account of observing Corbin with large quantities of pills, guns, and cash, her testimony 
regarding Corbin’s admission to robbing pharmacies and her role within Corbin’s 
criminal enterprise, and her admission to giving false grand jury testimony out of fear of 
reprisal.   
 We review Stevenson’s testimony against this background.  Principally, it made 
her appear more credible and explained why she succumbed to Corbin’s demands.  It 
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rebuffed Corbin’s attempt to paint her as a criminal trying to cut a favorable deal with 
prosecutors and shed light on why Corbin felt comfortable discussing his criminal 
activity with her.  Moreover, it explained why Stevenson went to great lengths to help 
Corbin carry out his criminal acts.  “[E]vidence concerning a witness’s credibility is 
always relevant, because credibility is always at issue[.]”  United States v. Green, 617 
F.3d 233, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  This was all the more true here, as 
Corbin launched a vigorous attack against Stevenson’s credibility on cross-examination.  
Thus, as with the other 404(b) evidence Corbin complains about, the predominant 
purpose of Stevenson’s testimony about the physical abuse she endured was not to smear 
Corbin’s character but to provide context for her other testimony and make her appear 
more credible. 
C.  
 Corbin and Corley also attack their sentences.  First, Corley contends that the 
District Court erred in sentencing him only four days after the jury returned its guilty 
verdict and without the benefit of a presentence investigation report (often referred to as a 
“PSR”).  As a general matter, Corley is right—a district court should not impose a 
sentence without consulting a PSR.  But the general rule doesn’t apply here.  Corley was 
convicted of four violations of § 924(c) and faced 82 years of mandatory imprisonment.  
Because the Court had no discretion to impose a lower sentence (only a higher one), the 
information contained in his PSR could have only hurt Corley. 
 Second, Corbin and Corley both contend that the District Court improperly 
imposed 25-year sentences on the successive § 924(c) convictions because they were all 
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contained in the same judgment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a 
second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.”).  It makes no difference that the § 924 
convictions were contained in the same judgment.  See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 
129 (1993).        
 Third, Corbin and Corley contend that the District Court erred in imposing its 
sentence in connection with the § 924(c) counts because the jury didn’t find that the 
“brandishing” element had been satisfied or that the multiple § 924(c) violations were 
“successive.”   Because this is the first time these arguments are raised, we review them 
for plain error—that is, we look to whether there was “an (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) 
that affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 314 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997)).         
 Corbin and Corley rely principally on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 
(2013), in contending that “[f]acts that increase [a] mandatory minimum sentence are [] 
elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 
2158.  Because the underlying trial took place before Alleyne—and while it was still good 
law for a court to determine whether the fact of “brandishing” was established—the 
District Court, rather than the jury, made the factual determination that Corbin and 
Corley brandished a firearm when robbing the various pharmacies.   
 To be sure, there is no Alleyne problem regarding the successive mandatory 
minimum sentences because the only additional fact requiring the imposition of the 
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mandatory minimum term—that each § 924(c) count is successive to the one before it—
is inherent in the jury’s verdict.  Thus, the only question before us is whether the District 
Court plainly erred in finding that Corbin and Corley brandished firearms, which 
increased their minimum penalty for the initial § 924(c) violation from five to seven 
years.   
 It did not.  The first robbery charge that resulted in a § 924(c) conviction (and thus 
the one seven-year term that Corbin and Corley each received) related to their July 23, 
2009 robbery of the Pepper Pharmacy.  At trial, the only fact in dispute was whether they 
were the armed robbers, and the evidence against them was overwhelming.  As they were 
armed, the absence of jury factfinding as to the “brandishing” element did not affect the 
outcome of the proceedings.2            
* * * * * 
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
                                              
2  Corbin and Corley raise numerous other arguments, but they are so clearly 
unpersuasive that we need not address them.  They include: (1) Corbin’s argument that 
the Government was required to charge him under 18 U.S.C. § 2118; (2) Corbin and 
Corley’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims; (3) Corbin’s argument regarding alleged 
discovery violations; (4) Corbin’s argument that the District Court violated his rights 
under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses; (5) 
Corbin’s argument that the District Court abandoned its neutral role and improperly 
inserted itself into the cross-examination of Nicole Perry; (6) Corbin’s argument that the 
District Court erred in admitting evidence of cooperating witnesses’ plea agreements; (7) 
Corbin’s argument that the Court abused its discretion in sustaining objections during the 
testimony of Agent Majarowitz; (8) Corbin’s argument that he was subjected to double 
jeopardy; (9) Corbin’s challenges to the grand jury proceedings; (10); Corbin’s argument 
that the trial proceedings caused a variance; (11) Corbin’s claims relating to the 
Government’s introduction of evidence regarding his cell phone usage at or near the time 
of the robberies; and (12) Corbin’s attack on the jury instructions.              
